The fact that after the shooting of the head of Al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, a vehement discussion broke out about a withdrawal of the ISAF-contingents cannot earlier than had been decided in the course of the NATO summit in London on 20th November 2010 does not surprise. The international basis of the ISAF-mission, however, has not been cancelled by the liquidation of Bin Laden at all. In this context it is not the presumed about 200 Al Qaida-“fighters” in Afghanistan with their terrorist attacks, which justify all UN-mandates continued up to this day. The symbiosis between Al Qaida and the Djihadistic Taliban in its former form, embodied by Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar, does not exist any longer since the shattering of the “Islamic Emirate Afghanistan” by the American-British military intervention as a consequence of 9/11. The real reason is the continuous assessment made in the Resolution 1386 of 2001 expressing that “the situation in Afghanistan still represents a threat for world peace and international security.” In this Resolution 1386 the lacking sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity are the factors which make the UN Security Council worry continuously about peace and security. Afghanistan is a failing state, thus endangering regional stability which is fragile anyhow. The collaboration of the different Taliban groups of Afghanistan with those of Pakistan is undoubtedly the sounding board for the endangering of security observed by the Security Council. After the withdrawal of ISAF 2014 the war will be finished for the country near. Like in the 1990ies, there are many signs for Afghanistan to sink into a civil war after 2014. Without Mullah Omar as the commanding and spiritual „Emir“ of the Taliban at the negotiating table there will be no peace, but does he really desire reconciliation and peace? Does he want social pluralism or repeated brute pushing of a radical missionary-religious sociopolitics within the limitations of an “Islamic Emirate Afghanistan” like already once before 1996? How can Pakistan with all its considerably different power groups be driven towards constructive and neighbourly politics of coexistence with Afghanistan? Moreover, who will be able to stop Iran using Afghanistan as a literally secondary theatre of war against the USA? Without support and help from outside Afghanistan will become a “failed state”. It requires financial aid for essential economic development and guarantees for its security. The West will be under the pressure of scarce budgetary means for years. Mullah Omar and his Taliban, however, as well as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Haqqani network, have all the time they need.